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De Re Attitude Reports about Disjunctive Attitudes 
 Introduction. Since (Kaplan, 1969) it has been assumed that the truth conditions (TCs) 
of a de re attitude report require there to be a concrete individual concept (IC) to which 
the attitude holder should assign a certain property. The bearers of such an individual 
concept could vary across the attitude holder’s alternatives but the concept itself had to 
remain fixed. We bring new evidence from de re attitude reports about disjunctive beliefs 
that challenges this view and suggests that the TCs of a de re attitude report must allow 
for ICs to vary across attitude alternatives. We account for such reports in terms of a 
revised version of the theory of concept generators (CGs) proposed in (Percus & 
Sauerland, 2003) (P&S). 
 Novel Data. Consider the scenario in (1): 
(1) Mary, the chair of the Linguistics Department of Santa Claus University, wants to 
hire a star. She wants to hire the best semanticist or the best syntactician. She is not 
specific and will be happy with either. Unbeknownst to her, John has recently 
received the best syntactician award as well as the best semanticist award. 
Native speakers of English report that, in this scenario, we can say (2) to John: 
(2) Mary wants to hire you! 
 The attitude report in (2) must be a de re report because the individual John is not part 
of the content of Mary’s desire. She wants to hire John only from the speaker’s point of 
view because it is in the actual world that the best semanticist and the best syntactician 
happen to be one person, namely John. Mary, of course, can believe otherwise. Her desire-
alternatives can contain worlds in which one person is the best syntactician and another 
is the best semanticist. And only one of them is hired in such worlds. 
 Predictions of P&S. To capture the TCs of a de re attitude report and avoid the so-
called double-vision problems (Quine, 1956), P&S introduce acquaintance-based CGs. 
The classical example of a de re report in (3)a gets the LF in (3)b and TCs in (3)c.   
(3) a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
   b. [S w Ralph [VP believes in w [CP λG<e,se> [CP λw' [CP that [S [[G Ortcutt] w'] [VP is  
                                                a spy in w']]]]]]] 
 c. ||(3)b||g = [w . ∃G: G is a CG for Ralph in w & ∀w' ∈ Dox(Ralph)(w):  
                                   [G(Ortcutt)](w') is a spy in w'] 
 In other words, P&S require that there be a CG that applies to Ortcutt and returns an 
Ortcutt-concept for Ralph in w. And, in each of Ralph’s doxastic alternatives, the bearer 
of that IC in that alternative is a spy. 
 We observe that in the context in (1) there is no acquaintance between the attitude holder 
and John, whereas P&S require the CGs to be acquaintance-based. Yet, it is a well-
established fact that de re attitude reports do not have to assume an acquaintance between 
the attitude holder and the res (Aloni, 2001; Fodor, 1970; Sosa, 1970; Yalcin, 2014). So, 
in what follows, we will not treat the presence of an acquaintance as a necessary 
component of the interpretation of a de re attitude report. 
 For (2), P&S predict the following interpretation: 
(4) ||(2)||g = [w. ∃G1: G1 is a CG for Mary in w & ∀w' ∈ Desire-Alt(Mary)(w): 
                                 Mary hires in w' [G1(youJohn)](w')] 
 According to (4), the CG that the attitude verb introduces generates a particular IC when 
applied to John. But what could this IC be? Given Mary’s disjunctive desire, it cannot be 
[λw . ιx(x is the best semanticist in w)] and it cannot be [λw . ιx(x is the best syntactician 
ВЫСКАЗЫВАНИЯ ОБ УСТАНОВКАХ И ИХ СЕМАНТИКА
Petr Kusliy ⋅ Ekaterina Vostrikova, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
DE RE ATTITUDE REPORTS ABOUT DISJUNCTIVE ATTITUDES
Логико-философские штудии. ISSN 2223-3954 49
in w)], because it is not the case that the best syntactician is hired in each of her desire 
alternatives. And neither is it the best semanticist. The IC [λw . ιx (x is the best semanticist 
in w and x is the best syntactician in w)] will not do either because it will be undefined in 
those of her desire alternatives where the best syntactician and the best semanticist are 
two different people. Finally, the IC [λw . ιx (x is the best semanticist in w or x is the best 
syntactician in w)] is also not suitable. Again, in those of Mary’s desire-alternatives where 
the best semanticist and the best syntactician are two different people, this concept will 
be undefined because it will not be able to pick out a unique individual. There does not 
seem to be any other options. From this, we conclude that the system of P&S requires a 
modification. 
 Proposal. We’ll get the TCs right if we can make sure that the IC [λw . ιx(x is the best 
semanticist in w)] is used in those alternatives where the best semanticist is hired and the 
IC [λw . ιx(x is the best syntactician in w)] is used in those alternatives where the best 
syntactician is hired. We thus need a system that will generate weaker TCs for (2) by 
giving us a (possibly different) John-concept in each of Mary’s desire alternatives. 
(5) Key idea: Step 1. Separate the following two components that are collapsed into one 
notion of a CG in P&S: (i) the component that generates the full set of John-concepts 
for Mary in w; (ii) a mechanism that chooses a concept from the generated set. Step 
2. Let the choice of a concept from the set of concepts be new for each desire-
alternative. 
 We substitute variables over CGs by variables over generators of concept sets (GCS), 
as defined in (6). Such functions will take an individual and return the full set of concepts 
of this individual for the attitude holder. We introduce variables over choice functions 
(CFs) of type <<se,t>,se>. A CF applies to a set of concepts and outputs one of them. 
 We need only one generator of sets of concepts for an attitude holder. Building on 
(Heim, 1982), we propose an existential closure over CF-variables that can freely apply 
at any clausal level. The semantics proposed for want is given in (7). The LF for (2) is 
given in (8). The resulting TCs are given in (9). 
(6) Q is the generator of a concept set (GCS) for x in w iff Q is of type <e,<se,t>> and, 
for all entities y, Q(y) is the set of y-concepts for x in w. 
(7) ||want||g = [w . λP<<<e,<se,t>>,st> . λx . ∀w' ∈ Desire-Alt(x)(w): 
                               P([ιQ: Q is the GCS for x in w])(w')=1] 
(8) [S w Mary [VP wants w [CP λG<e,<se,t>> [λw’ . [S ∃f : [S PRO [VP to hire in w' [[[G 
you] f] w']]]]]]]] 
(9) ||(8)||g = [w. ∀w' ∈ Desire-Alt(Mary)(w): ∃f: Mary hires in w' 
                         [f ([ιQ: Q is the GCS for Mary in w](youJohn))](w')] 
 In this system, an existential closure over CF-variables is allowed either at the level of 
the embedded TP or at the matrix level. In (8), f is a variable over CFs that is existentially 
closed at the lower level. Thus, in each desire-world, a different CF might pick out a 
different concept for one and the same individual John. Consequently, the interpretation 
in (9) is weaker than the one in (4) and correctly captures the meaning of (2). 
 This system has an additional technical advantage. In order to account for cases like 
“John thinks that Clark Kent is not Superman”, P&S require two CGs. So, attitude verbs 
must be able to potentially introduce infinitely many CGs and take complements of 
unlimited complexity (known as the type flexibility of attitude verbs (Charlow & Sharvit, 
2014; Cresswell & Stechow, 1982)). This shortcoming is avoided in our system. 
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